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ABORTION AND THE PRESIDENTIAL 
ELECTION OF 1976: A MULTIVARIATE 
ANALYSIS OF VOTING BEHAVIOR 
Maris A. Vinovskis* t 
During the 1960s and 1970s, the American public was deeply 
split over civil rights, the war on poverty, and Vietnam. Analysts 
frequently divided the electorate into new categories such as the 
"New Liberals" and the "Silent Majority" as issue-oriented poli-
tics polarized the nation. Yet by the mid-1970s, most of the con-
troversies of the previous decade had faded or disappeared en-
tirely. The end of the war in Vietnam, Watergate, increasing 
inflation, and domestic energy shortages turned most Americans 
inward and away from the larger social debates of the 1960s. 
Today, concern about inflation, unemployment, energy, and 
foreign policy alternatives has largely replaced the discussion of 
new domestic social programs. One possible exception to the lack 
of interest in social questions today is the debate over abortion. 
As the "pro-life" and "pro-choice" groups continue their battles 
within Congress and among the voters, many observers, particu-
larly those in the news media, see abortion as one of the most 
divisive and important controversies of the 1970s.1 In fact, follow-
ing the widely publicized defeats of prominent pro-choice politi-
cians such as Senator Dick Clark of Iowa and Representative 
Donald Fraser of Minnesota in 1978, many analysts are predicting 
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1. The choice of words used to describe the opposing sides of the abortion debate is 
in itself controversial. For example, the use of the term "pro-life" to designate those who 
are against abortions is resented by their opponents because it implies that those who 
favor abortions are "anti-life." Rather than taking sides on this matter, I shall use the 
terms commonly utilized by each faction for itself. Thus, those groups opposing abortions 
will be referred to as "pro-life" while those favoring abortions will be designated as "pro• 
choice." 
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that abortion will be one of the major factors in federal and state 
elections in 1980. As Anthony Lewis of the New York Times re-
cently observed: 
Over the last few years political analysts have noted the signif-
icance of the single-issue voter: the person who cares only about a 
candidate's views on gun control, for example, or busing, or capital 
punishment. It is clear now, I think, that one such issue is likely 
to have the largest impact on American politics for the longest 
time. That is abortion.2 
Despite the widespread public interest in the role of the abor-
tion controversy in American politics today, no one has at-
tempted to analyze systematically its impact on the electorate.=1 
Some national opinion surveys have asked voters whether or not 
they would be influenced by a candidate's position on abortion, 
but they have not attempted to ascertain its relative importance, 
compared to other considerations, in the final deliberations of the 
electorate. In an effort to provide a more systematic study of the 
role of abortion in American politics today, this Article analyzes 
the campaign to elect the President of the United States in 1976. 
In particular, it studies the coverage of abortion by the news 
media, its importance in public opinion polls taken during the 
campaign, and its relative impact on voters on November 2, 1976, 
using multivariate analysis and survey research data. 
J. ABORTION AND THE PRESIDENTIAL 
CAMPAIGN OF 1976 
Repeated efforts to liberalize state abortion statutes during 
the 1960s culminated in changes in Colorado's restrictive abortion 
law in 1967. Seventeen other states followed suit and liberalized 
their abortion statutes before January 1973, when the Supreme 
Court declared almost all of the existing state laws against abor-
tion unconstitutional.4 Yet those early efforts to abolish restric-
2. Cited in Minneapolis Tribune, Nov. 17, 1978, at lOA. 
3. The study of population policy in general and of abortion in particular has been 
rather limited to date - particularly empirical efforts to analyze popular or legislative 
voting behavior. For collections of essays on population policy and abortion, see 
POPULATION AND PoLmCS: NEW DIRECTIONS IN PoLmCAL SCIENCE REsEARCH (R. Clinton ed. 
1973); POPULATION POLICYMAKING IN THE AMERICAN STATES (1974); REsEARCH IN THE PoLmCS 
OF POPULATION (1972); POLITICAL lssUES IN U.S. POPULATION POLICY (1974); ABORTION AND 
SOCIAL JUSTICE (1972); ABORTION IN THE SEVENTIES: PROCEEDINGS OF THE WESTERN REGIONAL 
CONFERENCE ON ABORTION, DENVER, COLORADO, FEBRUARY 27-29, 1976 (1977); ABORTION: 
NEW DIRECTIONS FOR POLICY STUDIES (1977). 
4. On the early developments in the efforts to liberalize abortion laws in the United 
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tions on abortions also mobilized strong opposition from various 
local pro-life groups. On the eve of the Supreme Court decision, 
the voters in Michigan overwhelmingly defeated an attempt to 
liberalize that state's abortion law.5 Thus, though a definite trend 
toward easing restrictions on abortions developed during the late 
1960s and early 1970s, those efforts were encountering increas-
ingly more determined and better organized opposition. 
The debate over abortion did not play a very prominent role 
in the presidential election of 1972. Although Richard Nixon 
raised the topic at several points in the campaign and sent a letter 
to Cardinal Terence Cooke of New York supporting the effort to 
repeal New York's liberalized abortion law, he did not try to make 
it one of his major issues. Other controversies such as the war in 
Vietnam captured the headlines and the attention of the elector-
ate and contributed more to Nixon's landslide victory over George 
McGovern than their differences over abortion. 6 
The Supreme Court decisions in Roe u. Wade1 and Doe u. 
Bolton8 on January 23, 1973, catapulted abortion to front-page 
attention. The pro-choice position suddenly became part of the 
Constitution. While most pro-choice activists basked in the after-
glow of their victory or turned their efforts to other social issues, 
the pro-life forces suddenly faced the formidable task of trying to 
States, see J. MOHR, ABORTION IN AMERICA: THE ORIGINS AND EvoLtmON OF NATIONAL 
POLICY, 1800-1900 (1978); L. LADER, ABORTION (1966); L. LADER, ABORTION Il: MAKING THE 
REvoLtmON (1973); P. MARX, THE DEATH PEDDLERS: WAR ON THE UNBORN (1971); Potter, 
The Abortion Debate, in THE SURVIVAL EQUATION: MAN, RESOURCES, AND His ENVIRONMENT 
91 (1971); P. Leahy, The Anti-Abortion Movement: Testing a Theory of the Rise and Fall 
of Social Movements (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Department of Social Science, 
Syracuse University 1975); Vinovskis, Jones, & New, Determinants of Legislative Voting 
Behavior on Population Policy: An Analysis of the Massachusetts House of Representa• 
tives in 1970 and 1971, in POPULATION POLICYMAKING IN THE AMERICAN STATES 239 (1974). 
5. Cathy Abernathy of the Department of History at the University of Michigan has 
been· doing research on the politics of abortion in Michigan during the referendum cam• 
paign in 1972 (unpublished paper, Ann Arbor, Michigan). For an example of a detailed 
state analysis of the politics of abortion, see P. STEINHOFF & M. DIAMOND, ABORTION 
POLITICS: THE HAWAII EXPERIENCE (1977). 
6. On the 1972 election, see Miller, Miller, Raine, & Brown, A Majority Party in 
Disarray: Policy Polarization in the 1972 Election, 170 AM. POLITICAL SCI. REV. 753 (1976); 
Popkin, Gorman, Phillips, & Smith, Comment: What Have You Done For Me Lately? 
Toward an Investment Theory of Voting, 170 AM. POLITICAL Sci. REv. 179 (1976); Steeper 
& Teeter, Comment on'~ Majority Party in Disarray," 70 AM. POLITICAL SCI. REV. 806 
(1976); RePass, Comment: Political Methodologies in Disarray: Some Alternative Inter• 
pretations of the 1972 Election, 17 AM. POLITICAL SCI. REv. 814 (1976); Miller & Miller, 
Ideology in the 1972 Election: Myth or Reality-A Rejoinder, 17 AM. POLITICAL SCI. REV. 
832 (1976). 
7. 410 U.S. 113 (1973). 
8. 410 U.S. 179 (1973). 
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reverse the Court's decision on abortion. Thus, Roe caused a role 
reversal that shifted political initiative on the abortion issue from 
the pro-choice group to the pro-life camp. The first major test of 
the political impact of the Supreme Court decision came in the 
congressional elections of 1974. Though some pro-life groups tar-
geted several congressmen whom they regarded as particularly 
pro-choice, a candidate's position on abortion proved relatively 
unimportant in most races. A detailed survey of the issues in the 
contests for the House and Senate during 1974 revealed that in 
the vast majority of the electoral contests, abortion was not a 
major campaign topic.9 
As the country prepared for the 1976 elections, the abortion 
issue received more discussion, and political observers began to 
wonder whether the attitudes of American voters toward abortion 
had changed as the result of the Supreme Court decision. Fre-
quently, the public shifts its opinion on an issue after the Su-
preme Court declares it to be either constitutional or unconstitu-
tional; one might have expected such a shift after Roe v. Wade. 
To ascertain any shifts in public opinion on abortion between the 
1972 and 1976 elections, we used the data from the American 
National Election surveys for 1972 and 1976.10 Since the exact 
wording of the questions about abortion can affect the level of 
support for or opposition to abortions, comparisons based on dif-
ferent surveys can be very misleading.11 The comparison between 
1972 and 1976, however, should be valid since the same question 
was asked in both years. Each respondent in 1972 and 1976 was 
shown a page with the following statements: 
1. Abortion should never be permitted. 
2. Abortion should be permitted only if the life and health 
of the woman are in danger. 
9. Rosoff, Support of Abortion Political Suicide?, 7 FAM. PLAN. PERSPEC. 13 (1975). 
Her findings are confirmed by my investigation of the campaign literature of candidates 
for the House, Senate, and state governors for 1974. 
10. The data used in this essay were made available by the Inter-University Consor-
tium for Political and Social Research. The data for the CPS 1976 American National 
Election Study were originally collected by the Center for Political Studies of the Institute 
for Social Research, the University of Michigan, under a grant from the National Science 
Foundation. Neither the original collectors of the data nor the Consortium bear any 
responsibility for the analysis or interpretations presented here. 
11. The influence of the exact wording used in questions about abortion on the level 
of support or opposition to abortions has already been extensively documented. For exam-
ple, see Blake, Abortion and Public Opinion: The 1960-1970 Decade, 171 SCIENCE 540 
(1971); Blake, The Abortion Decisions: Judicial Review and Public Opinion, in ABORTION: 
NEW DIRECTIONS FOR POLICY STUDIES 51 (1977). 
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3. Abortion should be permitted if, due to personal 
reasons, the woman would have difficulty in caring for 
the child. 
4. Abortion should never be forbidden, since one should 
not require a woman to have a child she doesn't want. 
7. Other 
The results of these surveys indicate that only a small percentage 
of the public in both years felt that abortions should never be 
permitted or never be forbidden (see figure 1). The great majority 
of people agreed that abortions should be permitted, but only 
under certain circumstances. 
The Supreme Court in Roe held that prior to the end of the 
first trimester, the abortion decision and its effectuation must be 
left to the medical judgment of the pregnant woman's attending 
physician. In the second trimester the state may, if it chooses, 
regulate and proscribe abortions, except where it is necessary for 
the preservation of the life or health of the mother. In other words, 
during the first six months of the pregnancy, the woman is free 
to have an abortion for any reason though the state may limit that 
choice in the second trimester if it so chooses. 
FIGURE 1 
ATTITUDE OF AMERICAN VOTERS TOWARD ABORTIONS 
IN 1972 AND 1976 
Never Be Permitted 
Only If Life and Health 
of Woman Is in Danger 
If, Due to Personal Reasons, 
Would Have Difficulty in 
Caring for Child 
Never Be Forbidden 
0 
17.2 
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Although the great majority of people agreed with the Supreme 
Court's decision to permit abortions (only 11.2% in 1972 and 
10.9% in 1976 felt abortions should never be permitted), more 
than half of the respondents also answered either that abortions 
should be forbidden or that they should only be allowed if the life 
and health of the woman are in danger (57.7% in 1972 and 55.6% 
in 1976). Thus, while the public accepted the Supreme Court's 
liberalization of abortions, it did not agree with the extent of the 
freedom the Court granted women to obtain abortions. 
Attitudes toward abortion changed very little between 1972 
and 1976. Though the percentage of Americans who felt that 
abortions should never be forbidden increased from 24.3% in 1972 
to 26.6% in 1976 and the proportion who felt it should never be 
permitted dropped from 11.2% to 10.9%, that shift is small 
enough that it might be simply the result of sampling error rather 
than any actual change in attitudes. Since there was apparently 
so little change in the attitudes of Americans toward abortions 
between 1972 and 1976, and since an overwhelming majority fa-
vored abortions if the life or health of the woman were in danger, 
one might have expected that abortion would not be a major 
campaign topic in 1976 any more than it was in either 1972 or 
1974. Yet, at least among some voters, the abortion debates were 
among the most divisive of the 1976 campaign, and they even 
captured the headlines momentarily. Why? 
One reason for the emergence of abortion as a campaign issue 
in 1976 was that the pro-life forces launched several organized 
efforts to force politicians to take a position on abortion even 
though most presidential aspirants would have preferred to avoid 
the matter altogether. On November 20, 1975, in a highly unusual 
move, the National Council of Catholic Bishops overwhelmingly 
adopted a "Pastoral Plan for Pro-Life Activities." The Pastoral 
Plan was addressed to "all Church-sponsored or identifiable 
Catholic national, regional, diocesan and parochial organizations 
and agencies" and called upon them to support a "comprehensive 
pro-life legislative program" that included the passage of a con-
stitutional amendment for the protection of the unborn child. 
The Bishops' Plan was unique not only for its legislative agenda, 
but also for its attempt to organize political support at the local 
levels during the 1976 election. The Plan stated: 
This effort at persuasion is part of the democratic process, and 
is carried on most effectively in the congressional district or state 
from which the representative is elected. . . . Thus it is absolutely 
1756 Michigan Law Review [Vol. 77:1750 
necessary to have in each congressional district an identifiable, 
tightly-knit and well organized pro-life unit. This unit can be de-
scribed as a public interest group or a citizens' lobby. No matter 
what it is called: 
(a) its task is essentially political, that is, to organize people 
to help persuade the elected representatives; and (b) ... it is 
focused on passing a constitutional amendment.12 
Throwing the weight of the National Council of Catholic 
Bishops behind the efforts to pass a constitutional amendment to 
limit abortions gave the pro-life forces an important boost toward 
legitimizing their activities and placing the abortion issue in the 
forefront of patential campaign topics for 1976. Furthermore, the 
unprecedented and dramatic political conduct of the bishops gen-
erated controversy that received additional media coverage. For 
example, the liberal National Catholic Reporter issued a highly 
critical editorial about the Pastoral Plan: 
If the bishops have created a Catholic party, and only time 
will tell, they have unleashed a fearsome thing. The Catholic 
Church - and its bishops - will have moved into the upper 
reaches of national politics as an identifiable political lobby/party 
of massive proportions. Such proportions, given the 48 million 
Catholic population in this country, could yet rival or counter-
balance the largest political parties or lobbies in this country: the 
Republican party, the Democratic party, and the AFL-CIO .... 
The National Conference of Catholic Bishops may have signaled 
a major change in th_e makeup of U.S. policies.13 
Although no cohesive, national Catholic party or lobby ever 
materialized during the 1976 election, the National Conference of 
Catholic Bishops did play a prominent role in the election, partic-
ularly in the later stages, by raising the question of whether the 
normally Democratic Catholic vote would go to Jimmy Carter, 
whose position on abortion leaned more toward pro-choice than 
that of Gerald Ford. By threatening to tie Catholic support to the 
abortion issue rather than to some other problem such as unem-
ployment or housing, the Pastoral Plan helped to push the abor-
tion controversy into the presidential campaign. 
While the National Conference of Catholic Bishops sought to 
mobilize support for a constitutional amendment against abor-
tions, other pro-life groups coalesced behind the candidacy of 
Ellen McCormack in the Democratic primaries. Running as a 
12. Cited in Planned Parenthood-World Population Washington Memo, Dec, 15, 
1975, at 2 (emphasis original). 
13. Cited in id. at 3. 
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zealous "right-to-life" advocate, McCormack took advantage of 
the new federal matching campaign funds for presidential candi-
dates who were able to raise at least $5000 in twenty states. 
Though McCormack's candidacy made little headway among 
most voters, her presence in primaries such as New Hampshire 
and Massachusetts forced other candidates to deal with abortion. 
Few people regarded her as a serious presidential candidate, but 
most viewed her campaign as an opportunity to publicize the 
movement for a constitutional amendment on abortion. As Jay 
Bowman, head of Georgia's Right-to-Life Committee, put it, 
"she's not a serious candidate, but she can get equal time [on 
television] for the pro-life message and she can get the Federal 
government to pay for the ads."14 
In the aftermath of the first presidential primary, the cause 
of pro-life groups gained an identifiable target. Jimmy Carter, a 
relatively unknown candidate, emerged as the winner of the Dem-
ocratic primary in Iowa. After his victory, several other Demo-
cratic candidates accused him of "waffling" on such issues as 
abortion, capital punishment, amnesty for Vietnam war evaders, 
and his own political record, an accusation that was to stay with 
Carter throughout the campaign. The Iowa primary directed na-
tional attention toward abortion because Carter was accused of 
deliberately misleading Iowa voters about his stand on abortion. 
Indeed, Carter campaigned in Iowa by emphasizing his personal 
opposition to abortion. In a statement for the Des Moines dioce-
san newspaper, the Catholic Mirror, he argued that "no active 
government should ever contribute to abortions. We should do all 
we can to minimize abortions and to favor a national statute that 
would restrict the practice of abortion in our country."15 
Carter's statements were interpreted by many pro-life activ-
ists in Iowa as indication of his support for a constitutional 
amendment to limit abortions; on this assumption, many of these 
activists supported Carter in the primary caucuses. Just a few 
days before the primary, however, some Catholic leaders sud-
denly realized that Carter did not really support a constitutional 
amendment. In Sioux City, Monsignor Frank J. Brady an-
nounced that, "I was misinformed that Governor Carter favored 
a constitutional amendment to reverse the Supreme Court's deci-
14. Cited in NEWSWEEK, Feb. 9, 1976, at 23. 
15. Cited in Planned Parenthood-World Population Washington Memo, Feb. 13, 
1976, at 1. 
1758 Michigan Law Review [Vol. 77:1750 
sion on abortion. " 16 Many people in the pro-life movement felt 
that Carter had deliberately misled them in Iowa, and this con-
tributed to their animosity towards him later in the campaign. 
Following Carter's unexpected but impressive victory in 
Iowa, the news media and the other candidates forced him to 
explain his position on abortion. In a statement to Newsweek, 
Carter clarified his stand: 
I think abortion is wrong. It should not be encouraged by the 
government. The government should take a positive role in pre-
venting unwanted pregnancies through education and family-
planning programs. I do not favor a constitutional amendment to 
give states local option-authority without knowing the specifics at 
this time. I might support a Federal statute minimizing abortions 
beyond the first thirteen weeks of pregnancy.'7 
Thus, though Carter reiterated his personal opposition to abor-
tion, he did not favor a constitutional amendment prohibiting 
abortions. Instead, he tried to leave the door open for some type 
of federal statute to limit abortions, but most observers doubted 
the constitutionality of any such act. 
Carter's difficulties with abortion soon forced other presiden-
tial aspirants to state their own positions. On the Democratic 
side, Senator Birch Bayh became the candidate most identified 
with the pro-choice position. As pro-life groups shifted their at-
tack from Carter to Bayh, Carter was able to direct his attention 
to other issues. 18 Though several of the other Democratic candi-
dates, especially George Wallace in the Florida primary, sought 
support from the pro-life forces, most observers felt that Ellen 
McCormack had cornered most of that support. 
On the Republican side, Ronald Reagan pursued and re-
ceived the support of many pro-life activists by endorsing a con-
stitutional amendment to restrict abortions. 19 Though Reagan 
was momentarily embarrassed by the fact that he had signed the 
16. Cited in id. at 2. 
17. NEWSWEEK, Feb. 2, 1976, at 18. 
18. Throughout the primaries, most of the editorial praise or support for presidential 
candidates in the pro-life National Right to Life News was either for Ellen McCormack 
or Ronald Reagan while Birch Bayh received a disproportionate amount of the criticism. 
During the early Democratic primaries, Carter received less scrutiny and attention than 
many of the other Democratic contenders. 
19. As the Republican convention was about to convene, Ronald Reagan singled out 
abortion as one issue on which he planned to challenge Ford before the Republican Plat-
form Committee. New York Times, Aug. 9, 1976, at 12. Rather than trying to make this a 
source of major contention between Reagan and himself, Ford's supporters accepted 
Reagan's position on abortion in the Republican platform. 
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liberalized abortion law in California, he repudiated his earlier 
behavior and wholeheartedly embraced the pro-life cause. Presi-
dent Ford, on the other hand, sought to find a middle ground. 
Rather than agreeing to a constitutional amendment to restrict 
abortions, he favored one to put the entire question back into the 
hands of the states. In a CBS television interview with Walter 
Cronkite, Ford summarized: 
I'm in a moderate position in that area. I do not believe in 
abortion on demand. I do not agree with the Supreme Court's 
decision in 1973. I do not agree that a constitutional amendment 
is the proper remedy. I think we should recognize that there are 
instances when abortion should be permitted. Illness of the 
mother, rape or other unfortunate things that might happen. So 
there has to be some flexibility. I think the Court decision went too 
far, I think the constitutional amendment goes too far. If there was 
to be some action in this area, it's my judgment that it ought to 
be on the basis of what each individual state wishes to do under 
the circumstances. Again, I should add that even though I disagree 
with the Court's decision, I have taken an oath of office and I will, 
of course, uphold the law as interpreted by the Court, but I think 
there is a better answer.20 
After Carter's victory in Iowa, the news media began to spec-
ulate at great length about the importance of the abortion issue. 
For example, in early February Newsweek proclaimed abortion as 
"1976's Sleeper Issue" while a New York Times headline claimed 
that "Abortion Is Big Issue in Primaries in Massachusetts and 
New Hampshire."21 The results of the New Hampshire and Mas-
sachusetts primaries, however, temporarily deflated the import-
ance of abortion in the campaign. Despite the predictions that 
Ellen McCormack might do very well in both primaries, she re-
ceived only about one percent of the vote in New Hampshire and 
3.5% in Massachusetts. Even more telling were the results of a 
New York Times/CBS poll of Massachusetts Democrats on pri-
mary day, which indicated that only seven percent of the Demo-
cratic voters thought abortion was an important issue and that 
only forty percent of that seven percent cast their ballots for Ellen 
McCormack. 22 
After the New Hampshire and Massachusetts primaries, the 
news media turned their attention away from abortion. Though 
20. Cited in Planned Parenthood-World Population Washington Memo, Feb. 13, 
1976, at 2. 
21. NEWSWEEK, Feb. 9, 1976, at 21; New York Times, Feb. 4, 1976, at 53. 
22. New York Times, Mar. 4, 1976, at 18. 
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the topic still surfaced from time to time, it did not generate as 
much concern from candidates and reporters as it had following 
the Iowa primary. Even when the Democratic Convention passed 
a resolution against a constitutional amendment and the Repub-
lican platform called for an amendment restricting abortions, the 
media showed little interest. But while the news media down-
played the abortion issue immediately after the conventions, the 
pro-life forces redoubled their efforts. Carter acknowledged that 
abortion was the most dis~ussed subject in the letters he received 
and that most of the writers felt that the Democratic party plat-
form on abortion was too liberal.23 Nevertheless, it was only when 
the Catholic bishops reentered the picture that the abortion issue 
suddenly recaptured the country's attention. 
On August 31, Carter met with six Roman Catholic bishops 
at the Mayflower Hotel in Washington. He expected to use the 
meeting to establish a better working relationship with those 
church leaders, and he had been led to believe that the meeting 
would permit productive discussion with the Catholic prelates of' 
social issues besides abortion. Unfortunately his strategy back-
fired as Archbishop Joseph L. Bernardin of Cincinnati, President 
of the National Conference of Catholic Bishops, refused to discuss 
other issues until they resolved the abortion question. As a result, 
when Archbishop Bernardin emerged from th.e meeting, he an-
nounced that he and his colleagues "continued to be disap-
pointed" with Carter's abortion stance.24 
Although supporters of the pro-life movement were not satis-
fied with Ford's compromise position and had fought for a Reagan 
victory, Ford's post-convention campaign nevertheless benefited 
from the movement's negative reactions to Carter. After Ford met 
with the six Catholic bishops on September 10, Archbishop Ber-
nardin said the group was "encouraged" though "not totally sat-
isfied" by the President's position on abortion. 25 By their public 
comments, the leaders of the National Conference of Catholic 
Bishops again stirred the abortion controversy toward the surface 
of the campaign stew. 
The news media quickly picked up on Carter's difficulties 
with the Catholic bishops over abortion. For example, the 
23. New York Times, July 25, 1976, at 30. 
24. For details on the meeting with the bishops, see M. SCHRAM, RUNNING FOR PRESI· 
DENT: A JOURNAL OF THE CARTER CAMPAIGN 250•53 (1977). 
25. U.S. NEWS & WORLD REPORT, Sept. 20, 1976, at 15-18; NEWSWEEK, Sept. 20, 1976, 
at 16-18. 
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Newsweek headline on the campaign ran: "On Abortion, the 
Bishops v. the Deacon."26 Speculation was rampant over whether 
Carter would be able to hold traditionally Democratic voters 
when Ford's position on abortion seemed much more acceptable. 
Carter's difficulties with the abortion issue were evident at sev-
eral campaign stops when pro-life demonstrators heckled him 
and prevented him from speaking.27 
In September 1976, just as abortion was being revived as a 
major campaign issue, the New York Times and CBS conducted 
another survey of the national electorate. Voters were asked, "Do 
you favor an amendment to the Constitution which would make 
abortions illegal, or do you oppose such a change in the law?" 
Contrary to the image projected by the pro-life demonstrations, 
the majority of Americans opposed such an amendment (see fig-
ure 2): Only 32% of the electorate favored a constitutional amend-
ment to declare abortions illegal, while 58% opposed it.28 • 
FIGURE 2 
ATTITUDE OF VOTERS ON AN AMENDMENT TO THE 
CONSTITUTION WHICH WOULD MAKE ABORTIONS ILLEGAL, 
SEPTEMBER 1976 
0 10 20 




27. See U.S. NEWS & WORLD REPORT, Sept. 20, 1976, 15-18; NEWSWEEK, Sept. 20, 
1976, at 11-12, 16-18. 
28. New York Times, Sept. 10, 1976, at 19. 
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Even more interesting from the perspective of the presiden-
tial campaign, however, was the unexpected discovery that the 
controversy over a constitutional amendment was basically non-
partisan (see figure 3). Although 45% of those opposed to an 
amendment supported Carter, 47% of those favoring a constitu-
tional amendment also supported him. 
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FIGURE 3 
PRESIDENTIAL PREFERENCES OF VOTERS BY THEIR 
POSITION ON A CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENT WHICH 
WOULD MAKE ABORTIONS ILLEGAL, SEPTEMBER 1976 
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Following the survey's release, the abortion controversy once 
again subsided as reporters and the news media concluded that 
both pro-life and pro-choice activism had relatively little impact 
on voters. Despite the continued efforts of the pro-life groups, 
abortion never regained the attention and importance that it en-
joyed in the media following the Iowa primary and the denuncia-
tion of Carter's position by the Catholic bishops. 
II. ABORTION AS A DETERMINANT OF VOTING 
BEHAVIOR IN THE PRESIDENTIAL ELECTION 
On November 2, American voters elected Carter by the clos-
est electoral margin in sixty years. Although Carter won 51 % of' 
the popular vote to Ford's 48%, the electoral count was so close 
that a switch of fewer than 8000 votes in Ohio and Hawaii could 
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have given Ford a 270 to 268 victory in the Electoral College. On 
the other hand, a shift of only 70,000 votes in eight other states 
would have given Carter a sizable 337 to 201 margin. 
Given the closeness of the election, it was inevitable that 
"Monday-morning quarterbacks" would second-guess the im-
portance of various events and issues in the campaign. Most ob-
servers concluded that abortion was not a significant factor in the 
election; pro-choice commentators were particularly quick to pro-
claim that the "election ... shows abortion not a major issue."w 
Because pro-choice forces had not been especially visible or effec-
tive during the race, they were content to declare the issue politi-
cally unimportant rather than try to claim a major victory from 
Carter's election. Moreover, Carter's willingness to place statu-
tory restrictions on abortions prevented pro-choice supporters 
from placing too much emphasis on his victory. The pro-life sup-
porters, however, now faced an unhappy predicament: on the one 
hand, they wanted to emphasize the importance of abortion in 
electoral politics; on the other hand, the candidate they had so 
vehemently opposed had just won. John Mackey of the Ad Hoc 
Committee in Defense of Life described it: 
HAD FORD PULLED IT OFF there is no doubt that abortion 
would have been labelled a major factor - it was a big reason for 
Carter's amazingly narrow win, and showed in such states as Indi-
ana, New Jersey, and Connecticut. But in politics it's winner-take-
all, and Carter's victory is a sharp setback to the anti-abortion 
movement (even though it won impressive victories in lesser 
races).30 
The issue still remains unresolved: Did the voters' positions 
on abortion influence their decisions to vote for Carter or Ford? 
The news media and many other observers flip-flopped through 
the campaign over whether abortion was a major factor, conclud-
ing in the final weeks that it was not particularly important. The 
abortion activists were split throughout the campaign - most 
pro-choice observers downplayed the political impact of the issue 
while their pro-life counterparts emphasized it - even after 
Carter's narrow victory. 
We can test for the relative importance of the abortion issue 
by using the survey data available from the American National 
Election Survey on American voting behavior ·from November 2, 
1976. Using a preelection questionnaire administered to 2248 re-
29. Planned Parenthood-World Population Washington Memo, Nov. 12, 1976, at 4. 
30. Lifeletter, Nov. 3, 1976, at I. 
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spondents and a postelection one that was given to 1909 respon-
dents, that survey offers clues to whether the abortion issue was 
an important factor in determining voter behavior. The question 
on abortion in that survey is the one we examined earlier - voters 
were given four statements on abortion and asked to indicate 
their personal preference for one of them. 
One might simply cross-tabulate the respondents' answers 
about abortion with the way they voted to see whether one's 
position on abortion influenced one's vote. In fact, this simple 
statistical procedure is the one most commonly employed in the 
few efforts to assess the relationship between abortion and voting 
behavior. It is inadequate, however, because it does not permit 
us to ascertain the relative importance of one's position on abor-
tion, compared to such other factors as one's party identification, 
attitude on other issues, or religious orientation. For example, we 
may find that pro-choice voters were more apt to support Carter, 
not so much because of his specific position on abortion, but 
because of his more liberal overall image compared to Ford. Thus, 
we need to control for the possible effects of other factors in trying 
to determine the role of abortion in the final decision to vote for 
Carter or Ford. 
Our data set consists of the responses of all persons in the 
postelection survey who voted for either Carter or Ford and who 
answered the question on abortion. The dependent variable (the 
one to be explained) is the vote on the presidency. As indepen-
dent variables we selected twelve different factors that may have 
influenced voters - age, sex, race, marital status, education, 
family income, religion, index of liberalism, identification, region 
of the country, size of the community, and attitude on abortion. 
Though the bulk of our analysis relied upon those independent 
variables, we also included in some calculations a series of vari-
ables measuring voters' attitudes on other social and economic 
issues, to see how well those other factors predicted voting behav-
ior compared to one's position on abortion. 
All of the data were analyzed using multiple classification 
analysis (MCA). Since many of the readers of this Article may not 
be familiar with multiple classification analysis, I will try to pro-
vide a brief introduction to this technique. MCA is' a form of 
multiple regression analysis with dummy variables. The predic-
tive value of each dummy variable is expressed as an adjusted 
deviation from the grand mean (overall average) of the dependent 
variable (whom a person votes for). For example, MCA answers 
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the question: how much of the vote for Carter is associated with 
someone being Catholic, while controlling for such other variables 
as the voter's age, sex, and the size of the community. Similarly, 
it also provides an approximate answer to the question: Ceteris 
paribus, what is the effect of one's religion on whether one votes 
for Carter? Multiple classification analysis "controls" for other 
variables by assuming that, as it looks at one class of a predictor 
variable, the distribution of all other predictor variables will be 
the same in that class as in the total population, thus "holding 
constant" their effects. Although traditional multiple regression 
programs also do this, MCA has three advantages: it does not 
require variables to be interval variables, it does not require or 
assume linearity and thus can capture discontinuities in the 
direction of association, and finally, it is more descriptive because 
it calculates the gross effects of a predictor class - the actual 
mean of the class - as well as the mean after adjusting for the 
influence of other variables. 31 
Our analysis reveals that one's position on abortion was not 
a good predictor, by itself, of whether one voted for Ford or 
Carter. In fact, voters did not divide in any consistent pattern for 
Carter or Ford on the basis of their own attitudes on abortion. 
While over fifty percent of those who said either that abortions 
should never be permitted or that they should never be forbidden 
voted for Carter, less than fifty percent of those who qualified 
their support for or opposition to abortion supported him (see the 
unadjusted percentages in figure 3). Furthermore, the weakness 
of attitudes on abortion as a predictor, by itself, of voting behav-
ior is confirmed by the fact that less than one half of one percent 
of the variation in voting can be explained by the abortion vari-
able (see eta2 in table A2 in the appendix). 
The relationship between attitudes on abortion and voting 
behavior became only slightly more consistent after we used 
MCA to control for the effects of the other independent variables. 
The results - the adjusted percentages in figure 4 - indicate 
that taking into account other possible determinants of voting 
behavior, voters who favored allowing abortions were more apt to 
vote for Carter than for Ford. For example, after controlling for 
-31. There are various issues associated with the use of multiple classification analysis 
that need to be considered before using this procedure. For an excellent and well-written 
introduction to multiple classification analysis, see F. ANDREWS, J. MORGAN, J. SoNQUJST, 
& L. KLEM, MULTIPLE CLASSIFICATION ANALYSIS: A REPORT ON A COMPUTER PROGRAM FOR 
MULTIPLE REGRESSION USING CATEGORICAL PREDICTORS (2d ed. 1973). 
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the other factors, only 47.7% of the voters who felt abortions 
should never be permitted voted for Carter, while 54.0% of those 
who thought abortions should never be forbidden voted for him. 
But although controlling for other factors reveals a consistent and 
expected relationship, it still does not show abortion to be a major 
determinant of voting behavior in 1976. In fact, the voter's atti-
tude on abortion was the weakest of all predictors.32 The two 
strongest predictors were an individual's party identification and 
index of liberalism (see the beta weights in table A2). 33 
We calculated one final measure of the relative importance 
of abortion in 1976. In the postelection portion of the American 
National Election Survey, each voter was asked: "What do you 
think are the most important problems facing this country?" The 
first three responses of each interviewee were recorded. While 
32. Since so much attention was focused on whether Carter would be able to maintain 
the Catholic vote, it is interesting to observe that 58.1 % of the Catholics supported him 
rather than Ford. However, after controlling for the effects of the other variables, Carter 
did not receive more support from Catholics than from the rest of the population (see table 
Al). 
33. For an analysis of the 1976 election and a comparison of the relative importance 
of issues in 1972 and 1976, see A. Miller & W. Miller, Partisanship and Performance: 
"Rational" Choice in the 1976 Presidential Election (unpublished paper presented at the 
American Political Science Association Meeting, Washington D.C., September 1977); W. 
MILLER, & T. LEVITAN, LEADERSHIP & CHANGE: PRESIDENTIAL ELECTIONS FROM 1952 TO 1976 
at 189-240 (1976); G. PoMPER, THE ELECTION OF 1976: REPORTS AND INTERPRETATIONS (1977). 
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18.9% of all the items mentioned dealt with inflation and 24.2% 
with unemployment, less than one tenth of one percent men-
tioned abortion - once again suggesting that only a very small 
minority of the 1976 electorate considered abortion an important 
issue. 
III. CONCLUSION 
Abortion was never a very important concern of voters during 
the 1976 presidential campaign. Yet it managed to capture the 
headlines in the weeks after the Iowa primary and in September 
after Archbishop Bernardin publicly denounced Carter's stance 
on abortion. But by the end of the campaign, even the news 
media, which had been eagerly exploiting the abortion issue ear-
lier, acknowledged that it simply was not a major campaign issue. 
On November 2, when voters pulled the levers in polling booths 
across the country, very few of them decided to vote for either 
Ford or Carter on the basis of the candidates' positions on abor-
tion. 
The pro-life movement attempted - and failed - to make 
a candidate's position on abortion a crucial factor in the election. 
Despite their dedication and intense efforts, its supporters were 
not able to mobilize the American public - not even those who 
basically agreed with them - on behalf of candidates who fa-
vored a constitutional amendment to restrict abortions. Yet they 
succeeded in temporarily convincing the news media that abor-
tion was a major issue in the campaign. Furthermore, they were 
able to force the presidential aspirants to take a position on abor-
tion, typically one that was to some extent critical of the Supreme 
Court decision. Thus, although unsuccessful, the pro-life forces 
were more active and visible than their pro-choice counterparts 
throughout the campaign. 
There are several reasons why abortion became a campaign 
issue even though most Americans did not perceive it to be a 
major national problem. The pro-life movement was very effec-
tive in mobilizing volunteers and staging demonstrations. Al-
though these demonstrators were always a small minority of the 
electorate, they managed to attract the news media. In addition, 
Ellen McCormack's campaign generated considerable publicity 
for the pro-life cause even though it ultimately drew few votes. 
The Catholic bishops and their Pastoral Plan were also impor-
tant. By appearing to make their acceptance or rejection of a 
presidential aspirant depend almost entirely on the candidate's 
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position on abortion, the bishops lent credibility and support to 
the pro-life efforts. Fourth, the emergence of fewer major cam-
paign issues in 1976 than in 1972 made it much easier for a rela-
tively unimportant but highly visible issue like abortion to cap-
ture public attention. Finally, and perhaps most importantly, the 
news media were particularly prone to exaggerate the importance 
of the abortion issue in American presidential politics. Until the 
public opinion polls and the election returns conclusively demon-
strated the weakness of abortion as a campaign issue, the news 
media were quite willing to depict it as a major factor. 
Although it is hazardous to speculate on the role of the abor-
tion issue in future presidential elections, I will venture some 
tentative observations based upon this statistical analysis as well 
as my assessment of trends in both the pro-life and pro-choice 
movements since 1976. It is likely that in 1980 both the pro-choice 
and pro-life groups will be much better organized and better fi-
nanced than in either 1972 or 1976. Furthermore, after some of 
the successes of the pro-life effort in the 1978 congressional cam-
paigns, the movement has exhibited an increasing tendency to 
participate in electoral politics at all levels. Similarly, the pro-
choice forces, in large part reacting to the activities of their oppo-
nents, seem to be more actively involved in politics. Nevertheless, 
there is still no indication whatsoever that the American public 
will perceive the abortion issue as any more important in 1980 
than in 1972 or 1976. Since the politicians as well as the news 
media have now had an opportunity to evaluate the limited im-
pact of abortion on two different presidential campaigns, perhaps 
abortion will not have the same high visibility in the news media 
and in the presidential campaign efforts in 1980 as in 1976. 
On the other hand, although it is likely that abortion will not 
play a major role in the presidential campaign of 1980, it probably 
will be more important in state and local elections, where the 
organized efforts of dedicated activists can be more influential. 
Even at the state and local levels, however, most voters probably 
will not decide solely because of the candidates' positions on 
abortion, yet the presence of pro-choice or pro-life activists will 
likely be more effective in these elections than in the presidential 
election. Compared with the 1976 results that I have documented 
in this Article, I suspect that in 1980 abortion will be much more 
of a state and local issue, and much less of a presidential issue. 
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Class Adjusted Net Number 
Mean Mean Deviation of Cases 
Religion: 
Presbyterian 35.7 50.8 + .2 78 
Lutheran 39.7 46.5 - 4.1 124 
Methodist 42.3 49.2 - 1.4 149 
Baptist 50.9 46.8 - 3.8 112 
Southern Baptist 60.2 52.1 + 1.5 110 
Other Protestant 45.3 51.0 + .4 297 
Roman Catholic 58.1 50.6 0 322 
Jewish 71.3 56.5 + 5.9 32 
Other Religion 48.5 48.4 - 2.2 14 
None or No Preference 68.0 61.7 +11.1 55 
Index of Liberalism: 
Liberal 84.1 62.9 +12.3 104 
Slightly Liberal 72.6 60.1 + 9.5 124 
Moderate 51.9 52.6 + 2.0 346 
Slightly Conservative 26.2 39.3 -11.3 196 
Conservative 16.5 36.8 -13.8 213 
Other 66.2 56.4 + 5.8 310 
Party Identification: 
Strong Democrat 91.2 84.1 +33.5 219 
Weak Democrat 74.7 71.6 +21.0 292 
Independent-Democrat 75.6 70.8 +20.2 145 
Independent-Independent 42.0 40.1 -10.5 133 
Independent-Republican 14.7 21.3 -29.3 139 
Weak Republican 21.2 26.0 -24.6 201 
Strong Republican 3.3 13.0 -37.6 164 
Region of Country: 
Northeast 54.7 53.4 + 2.8 281 
Central 47.1 53.2 + 2.6 411 
South 53.4 46.5 - 4.1 382 
West 46.9 49.2 -1.4 219 
Degree of Urbanization: 
Under 2500 51.4 52.2 + 1.6 408 
2500-9999 43.7 49.0 -1.6 251 
10,000-49,999 45.5 50.1 - .5 273 
50,000-349,999 53.0 48.9 - 1.7 214 
350,000 and Up 65.5 52.2 + 1.6 147 
Attitude on Abortion: 
Never Permitted 56.0 47.7 - 2.9 127 
Only If Life of Woman 
Is in Danger 49.1 49.6 .4 206 
Permitted for Personal 
Reasons 46.6 50.2 .4 206 
Never Forbidden 53.6 54.0 + 3.4 354 
Other 49.2 46.5 - 4.1 50 
Total 50.6 1293 
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TABLE A2 
PERCENTAGE VOTING FOR CARTER FOR PRESIDENT, 





Marital Status .0068 
Education .0307 
Family Income .0393 
Religion .0272 
Index of Liberalism .1871 
Party Identification .4103 
Region of Country .0026 
Degree of Urbanization .0137 
Attitude on Abortion .0005 
R2 = .4421 Note: The Eta2s and R2 have been adjusted 
for the degrees of freedom. 
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Beta 
.0544 
.0252 
.0786 
.0230 
.0250 
.0850 
.0627 
.1793 
.5307 
.0604 
.0295 
.0020 
